Mike's Notes
In his essay series, Universal Evolution, Probability and Life's Origins, James Miller referred to Charlie Broad. Here is his entry from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. He had a lot to say about emergence.
Resources
References
Repository
- Home > Ajabbi Research > Library >
-
Home > Handbook >
Last Updated
17/05/2025
Charlie Dunbar Broad
From the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
First published Fri Sep 3, 2010; substantive revision Mon Aug 9, 2021
Charlie Dunbar Broad (1887–1971) was an English philosopher who for the
most part of his life was associated with Trinity College, Cambridge.
Broad’s early interests were in science and mathematics. Despite being
successful in these he came to believe that he would never be a first-rate
scientist, and turned to philosophy. Broad’s interests were exceptionally
wide-ranging. He devoted his philosophical acuity to the mind-body problem,
the nature of perception, memory, introspection, and the unconscious, to the
nature of space, time and causation. He also wrote extensively on the
philosophy of probability and induction, ethics, the history of philosophy
and the philosophy of religion. The ample scope and scale of Broad’s work is
impressive. In addition he nourished an interest in parapsychology—a subject
he approached with the disinterested curiosity and scrupulous care that is
characteristic of his philosophical work.
Broad did not have “a philosophy”—if by that phrase is meant highly
original philosophical theories, and a highly original way of approaching
philosophical problems. He writes: “I have nothing worth calling a system of
philosophy of my own, and there is no philosopher of whom I should be
willing to reckon myself a faithful follower” (1924, p. 77). The reader is
nonetheless likely to reap philosophical insights from Broad’s manner of
meticulously setting out and carefully assessing the theories that prima
facie provide solutions to a given philosophical problem. This feature of
his writings is aptly described by A. J. Ayer: “The subject is discussed
from every angle, the various possibilities judiciously set out, the
precedents cited, the fallacious arguments exposed: nothing is skimped:
looking for reason, we are not fobbed off with rhetoric” (Part of my Life,
1977, pp. 117–8). Broad combines fairness, astuteness as well as rare powers
of observation.
Philosophers who influenced Broad were (apart from the great philosophers
of the past) his teachers at Cambridge, Russell and Moore, and J. M. E.
McTaggart and W. E. Johnson; at St. Andrew’s he received important
additional influence from G. F. Stout and A. E. Taylor. The diversity of
their thought is mirrored in Broad’s own exceptional range of
interests.
Broad led a relatively uneventful life—“not unlike,” he says in his
“Autobiography,” “that of a monk in a monastery” (1959b, p. 67). He hadn’t
been out of the British Isles until 1946 when he visited Sweden—a country he
“fell in love with,” and returned to nearly every year. On a professional
level he made acquaintances with several Swedish philosophers (such as
Konrad-Marc Wogau at Uppsala University). In the academic year 1953–4 Broad
visited the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor and the University of
California at Los Angeles. He writes with great warmth of the “kindness and
hospitality” with which he was received, and adds with characteristic
modesty: “It was good fun to be treated as a great philosopher” (1959b).
Broad was a homosexual, and never married.
1. Brief Chronology of Life and Works
2. Perception
2.1 Naïve Realism Delineated
2.2 Prehension: the Core Notion of Perceptual Immediacy
2.3 Naïve Realism Dismantled
2.4 Rivalling Accounts of Perceptual Sensations
2.5 The Theory of Representative Perception
3. Time
4. Free Will
5. Emergentism
5.1 The Concept of Emergence
5.2 The Reality of Emergence
5.3 Broad’s Knowledge Argument
6. Metaphilosophy
7. Other Philosophical Work
Bibliography
Primary Literature: Broad’s Works
Secondary Literature
Academic Tools
Other Internet Resources
Related Entries
1. Brief Chronology of Life and Works
1887, born in Harlesden, now a suburb of London, on December 30.
1905, wins a science scholarship to Trinity College, Cambridge.
1911, elected to a fellowship at Trinity; assistant to G. F. Stout, at the
University of St. Andrew’s.
1914, lecturer at Dundee (at the time a part of St. Andrew’s); during World
War I combines lecturing duties with work in a chemical laboratory for the
Ministry of Munitions; publication of Perception, Physics, and
Reality.
1920, elected Professor of Philosophy at the University of Bristol.
1923, Fellow and Lecturer in Moral Science at Cambridge; publication of
Scientific Thought.
1925, publication of The Mind and Its Place in Nature.
1930, publication of Five Types of Ethical Theory.
1933, Knightbridge Professor of Moral Philosophy at Cambridge; publication
of Examination of McTaggart’s Philosophy, Vol. I.
1938, publication of Examination of McTaggart’s Philosophy, Vol. II.
1953, retires from Knightbridge Professorship; publication of Religion,
Philosophy and Psychical Research.
1962, publication of Lectures on Psychical Research.
1971, dies age 83 on March 11 in his rooms in Trinity College,
Cambridge.
2. Perception
Broad dealt with perception in several works. He is well known as an
advocate of The Theory of Representational Realism, according to which our
perceptions are indirect cognitive transactions with the world: a perceptual
experience of a worldly object is not an immediate awareness of the object
itself, but mediated by an immediate awareness of a sensum. For example,
when we see a coin from a certain angle we are immediately aware of an
elliptical sensum.
2.1 Naïve Realism Delineated
Broad’s treatment of perception in The Mind and Its Place in Nature sets
off with a careful description of Naïve Realism. And this seems a suitable
place to begin our exposition of his theory of perception. What, then, does
Naïve Realism say? To pre-philosophical reflection perception seem to
provide us with some sort of immediate cognitive contact with a physical
object, for example a bell. Consider a situation where we perceive a bell.
Compare this situation with one where we are merely thinking of a bell.
There is a deep difference between the situations. We could “vaguely express
one part of this difference by saying that in the perceptual situation we
are ‘in more immediate touch with’ the bell than in the thought-situation”
(1925, p. 144).
This rough and ready picture of the Naïve Realist view must, however, be
slightly modified. Suppose we visually perceive an apple. Clearly there is a
sense in which we do not perceive “all” of the apple. There is a sense in
which we are aware of only a part of its surface; and we are (in that sense)
aware only of the sensible colour of that part but not of its sensible
temperature. Thus perception provides us with a cognitive contact a part of
the apple, but no more. It is, then, strictly speaking only a part of the
apple with which we are acquainted; it is only a part of the apple that is
sensuously manifested to us. (1925, pp. 148–50.)
Broad does not equate or identify the perception of a worldly object with
the sort of immediate acquainting awareness we have (or seem to have) with
its facing surface (pace Chisholm, 1957, p. 154). He is, on the contrary,
careful to point out that the experience features more than this awareness:
it also has an intentional content. Broad designates this the external
reference of the experience. By virtue of its external reference the
experience of the apple represents the sensuously manifested constituent as
an integral part of a larger spatio-temporal whole, having a whole array of
properties not sensuously manifested to us. (1925, pp. 150–4.)
What is the nature of the external reference? Broad warns against the risk
of unduly “intellectualising” perception. The external reference is not
reached by inference from what is sensuously manifested; nor is it a belief
or judgement simply accompanying the awareness of the manifested
constituent: “At the purely perceptual level, people do not have the special
experience called ‘belief’ or ‘judgment’” (1925, p. 153).[1]
2.2 Prehension: the Core Notion of Perceptual Immediacy
When we visually perceive the apple we have an experience in which its
facing red surface is a sensuously manifested objective constituent; we
perceive the apple but are, strictly speaking, only acquainted with a
portion of it.[2] Broad sometimes prefers to say that we prehend the facing
surface (or ostensibly prehend the surface). Now the notion of prehension is
fundamental for an understanding of Naïve Realism as well as
Representational Realism, so it seems advisable to briefly take a somewhat
closer look on Broad’s account of it.
Broad does not think it is possible to give a strict definition of phrases
such as “S prehends x as red” or the equivalent phrase “x sensibly presents
itself to S as red”.[3] What one can do is to contrast the notion of
prehension with other notions: “The meaning of these phrases cannot be
defined, it can only be exemplified. One thing that is certain is that to
prehend x as red is utterly different from judging that it is red or knowing
that it is red” (1952a, p. 13; italics in original). For example, in the
dark and with my eyes shut I may very well judge (or know) that the apple is
red. But in such conditions I am “not prehending anything as red, or, what
is precisely equivalent, nothing is sensibly presented to me as red” (ibid,
p. 14). Broad notes that this is substantiated by the fact that a cat or a
dog that lacked concepts might, it seems, have a prehension of something as
red even though it cannot (lacking the requisite concepts) literally know or
judge that it is red.
Prehension is, however, intimately related to knowledge. Broad asks us to
consider a subject “which has appropriate general concepts and is capable of
making judgements and knowing facts”. Suppose this subject prehends a
certain particular object as red. Then this “suffices to enable him to know
the fact that it is red. Whether he does or does not actually contemplate
this fact at the time depends on various contingent circumstances” (1952a,
p. 14; Broad’s emphasis).[4]
2.3 Naïve Realism Dismantled
Naïve Realism, properly articulated, says that when we perceive a physical
object it is only a part of the apple that is sensuously manifested to us:
this, and only this, is an objective constituent in the perceptual
situation. Now can this view be defended? Broad does not think so. He levels
several arguments against Naïve Realism, two of which will receive attention
here.
The Argument from Hallucination. Consider a veridical perception and
compare it with a subjectively indistinguishable delusive or hallucinatory
perception, for example that of a drunkard hallucinating a pink rat. Neither
a pink rat nor a part of a pink rat could be a sensuously manifested
constituent in the delusive situation.
And, since there is no relevant internal difference between the veridical
and the delusive perceptual situation, it is reasonable to suppose that in
no case does a perceptual situation contain as a constituent the physical
object which corresponds to its epistemological object, even when there is
such a physical object. (1925, p. 156; italics added.)
It might be held that the subjective indistinguishability of a veridical
perceptual and a hallucinatory situation entails that the experiences have
an identical constitution (and that, therefore, no material object is a
constituent even in the veridical situation). That is, however, not Broad’s
position: it could be that a material object is an objectively manifested
constituent in a veridical situation (whilst not in the indistinguishable
hallucinatory situation). He holds, however, that that is not the more
reasonable view of the matter.
The Argument from Illusion. Consider a person perceiving a penny from a
series of slightly different angles and distances. He would unhesitatingly
assume that in each of the slightly differing perceptual situations the
facing brownish surface of a certain penny is sensuously manifested to him.
But in Broad’s view this could not be so: “If he carefully inspects the
objective constituents of these perceptual situations he will certainly find
that they seem to be of different shapes and sizes” (1925, p. 158). The
objective constituent will in most of the situations seem elliptical rather
than circular. This indicates, Broad claims, that in each perceptual
situation, the constituent—the sensuously manifested item—cannot be the top
of the penny. What happens is that instead of being immediately aware of the
circular surface of the penny (as he takes himself to be) he is immediately
aware of an elliptical item, an elliptical sensum. Hence it is an elliptical
sensum rather than the circular surface of the penny that is manifested to
the subject. The same holds mutatis mutandis when we perceive a white sheet
of paper dimly lit by a candle. On careful consideration it seems clear that
the paper looks yellowish to us. So what we are immediately aware of is a
yellowish sensum rather than the white sheet of paper we are looking
at.
In order to bring out at least some of the facets of Broad’s theory it
seems advisable to turn to a few of the many objections that have been
raised against it.
(1) It has sometimes been objected that the argument from illusion is
flawed from the start since there is usually no risk of anyone being taken
in by the situation. Broad’s response to this objection is clear. When we
look at the penny from an oblique angle it appears elliptical, but not in
the sense that anyone is taking in by the situation, and mistakenly comes to
believe or judge that the penny is elliptical. He is explicit on the point:
“‘looking elliptical to me’ stands for a peculiar experience, which,
whatever the right analysis of it may be, is not just a mistaken judgement
about the shape” (1923, p. 237). The penny sensibly appears elliptical. And
it is this rather than any supposed tendency to be deceived which creates
problem for Naïve Realism (pace Austin 1962, p. 26).
(2) It has often been objected that philosophers who have made use of the
argument from illusion that they neglect the fact of perceptual constancy.
In his later works Broad admits that this complaint is justified. However,
the “recognition of the phenomenon of constancy merely shifts the point of
application of the argument” (1947b, p. 112). There is a class of perceptual
experiences of a material object, X, where constancy holds; there is also a
class of experiences of X where constancy breaks down. In theory it is
logically possible to hold that the facing surface of X is sensuously
presented in the perceptual experiences belonging to the first class but not
in the experiences belonging to the second class. “But, in view of the
continuity between the most normal and the most abnormal cases of seeing,
such a doctrine would be utterly implausible and could be defended only by
the most desperate special pleading” (1952a, p. 9).
What I just said might create the impression that Broad’s phenomenology is
rather unsophisticated or crude. On the whole that is certainly not the
case. For example, he points out that “the visual field” is
three-dimensional: “A sphere does look different from a circle, just as a
circle looks different from an ellipse” (1923, p. 290; Broad’s emphasis).
And the same holds, mutatis mutandis, for the intimately related
characteristics distance and depth; these are also purely visual
characteristics of the visual field (pp. 295–300).[5]
(The constancy objection to any argument of illusion that appeals to cases
such as the penny seen obliquely is a compelling one, to say the least. In
spite of that I will, for convenience of exposition, occasionally make use
of the example below.)
(3) A stock objection to sense-data theories has been that they invite
scepticism with regard to the external world. Broad regrets the sceptical
consequences but—given the strength of the case for the sense-datum
theory—does not consider them sufficient grounds for dismissal. Seeking to
preserve as much as possible of the common sense notion of material objects
he argues for the existence of such objects conceived of as having “primary
qualities” such as shape, size, and position (apart from such properties as
electric charge and mass). (1925, pp. 195–204.) Not surprisingly, he rejects
the idea that material objects have “secondary properties” such as
(phenomenal) redness or (phenomenal) hotness. Broad is perfectly clear that
it does not follow from the fact that such properties are never sensuously
manifested in our perceptual experiences that the material objects causing
our experiences lack these properties: it does remain possible that there
are red and green, hot and cold material objects even though they are not
objects of acquaintance. He argues, however, that there is no reason to
believe that material objects have these properties. (1925, pp.
205–6.)
2.4 Rivalling Accounts of Perceptual Sensations
Now Broad is perfectly clear that the sensum analysis of perception cannot
be established simply by pointing to such phenomena as the penny seen
obliquely. He does not for a moment suppose that it is possible to logically
infer that there is an elliptical sensum from the proposition that something
sensibly appears elliptical (pace Barnes 1945, p. 113). What he claims is
that there are considerations that can be adduced in support of the sensum
analysis. When we look at the penny from the side we certainly seem to be
aware of something elliptical. So we certainly seem to have before our minds
something that is elliptical. Obviously “we can quite well mistakenly
believe a property to be present which is really absent, when we are dealing
with something that is only known to us indirectly, like Julius Cæsar or the
North Pole” (1923, p. 241; Broad’s emphasis). But there are phenomenological
differences between perception and belief (or thought) that seem to call for
different accounts of their nature. In perception we seem to be dealing with
properties that are presented to us. Consider the case of perceiving a stick
half immersed in water. Here we are dealing with a concrete visible object, which is bodily present to
our senses; and it is very hard to understand how we could seem to ourselves
to see the property of bentness exhibited in a concrete instance, if in fact
nothing was present to our minds that possessed that property. (1923, p.
241; Broad’s emphasis; see also pp. 244–5)
I believe that what Broad is driving at here is that perceptual
consciousness has a presentational nature, and it is this that makes it
plausible to regard it as involving the literal presence of objects with
various qualities, such as colours in the case of visual perception, sounds
in auditory, etc.
Broad’s theory of perception employs an act-object analysis of sensations.
Lest it should be thought that he should be incapable to think of any
alternative account it should be noted that he examines such an analysis as
early as in 1921. G. F. Stout and H. A. Prichard defended such an
alternative (both of whom Broad held in the highest regard). Their account
could be considered an early version of the adverbial analysis of
sensations. Broad asks us to consider a headache. “It is by no means clear
that a headache means a state of mind with a headachy object [i.e. an act
with a certain object]; it seems on the whole more plausible to say that
that it is just a headachy state of mind” (1921b, p. 392). To have a
headache is not to be aware of a headachy object but to feel in a certain
way.[6] The alternative account claims that this holds mutatis mutandis for
any type of sensation. Thus what is described as ‘a sensation of red’ is a
unitary state of mind, and strictly speaking not a state which decomposes
into an act of sensing and a sensed red patch.
Broad provides a fairly thorough discussion of the relative merits of the
adverbial and the act-object analysis. In a nutshell, his conclusion is that
although the adverbial analysis is highly plausible regarding such mental
phenomena as bodily feelings; but it is implausible when it comes to those
of visual and auditory experiences: the act-object analysis is the more
plausible account of such experiences, in Broad’s opinion. (See Broad 1923,
pp. 252–7.)[7]
So much for sensations. What about sensa? What are they on Broad’s account?
A brief answer must suffice here. Sensa are a certain kind of transitory
particulars, which in the case of visual perception have such properties as
shape, size, colour, etc (1925, p. 181f.).[8]
2.5 The Theory of Representative Perception
The position Broad reaches is the following. A perceptual experience has a
certain intentional content. It differs from thought- and belief-episodes by
including a sensory phase, and it is primarily this that is responsible for
the distinctive phenomenology of perception. The sensory phase consists of
sensations. These decompose into acts of sensing and object sensed, sensa. A
sensum has the phenomenal properties that the perceived object (sensibly)
appears to have—red or warm or squeaky. An act of sensing a sensum
constitutes an immediate acquainting awareness of the sensum in question.
Although our perceptual experiences seem to grant us an acquaintance with
the facing surfaces of material objects, sensa are the only items we are
acquainted with.
The intentional content—the external reference—of a perceptual experience
is in a certain sense based upon sensa (thought not in the sense that there
is a train of swift inference leading from the presence of a sensum to the
mind to a certain perceptual belief). (1923, pp. 246–7.) It is this content
which represents the environment as featuring a physical object so-and-so.
Sensa are clearly incapable of carrying such content. Furthermore, from the
very nature of the case the general notion of physical object “cannot have
been derived by abstraction from observed instances of it, as the notion of
‘red’ no doubt has been.”[9] In fact, general concept of a physical object
“is not ‘got out of’ experience until it has been ‘put into’ experience. It
is best described as an innate principle of interpretation which we apply to
the data of sense-perception” (1925, p. 217).
3. Time
It is possible to distinguish roughly three different phases in Broad’s
philosophy of time.
In his (1921a) Broad defends a Russellian theory of time. On this
Eternalist view past, present, and future are equally real. There is nothing
ontologically special about the present: the present is no more real than
the past or the future. Accordingly Broad rejects Presentism—the view that
only the present is real—as “mere rhetoric rooted in confusion” (1921a, p.
226). Presentism has its roots in two errors. One of these errors is to
equivocate between two different senses of “co-existence”. “In one sense the
parts of any related whole co-exist; in another only those events that
occupy the same moment of time co-exist.” The whole course of the history
obviously cannot co-exist in the latter sense, but this does not “prevent it
from co-existing in the first”. The other error is to believe that “past,
present, and future are essential characteristics of objects in time in the
same way as before and after are, instead of being analysable into the
temporal relations of states of mind and their objects” (p. 337). Thus Broad
rejects the view that past, present, and future are characteristics
possessed by objects in time. These “characteristics” are a mere reflection
of our subjective perspective on objects. Some of our mental states are
essentially contemporary or simultaneous with their objects, e.g. our
immediate awareness of sense data. Other states are essentially later than
their objects, e.g. memories. (Cf. p. 336.) A related, and perhaps more
important facet of Broad’s (1921a) position here, is his adoption of a
Russellian analysis of tensed discourse. According to this analysis—versions
of which were later to become orthodox—the function of tensed verbs or
temporal adjectives in tensed statements is performed in the analysans by a
tenseless copula, IS, and a temporal relation—earlier than, simultaneous
with, or later than. Thus “It is raining” (or “It is raining now”) is
unpacked as “It IS raining at a moment simultaneous with my assertion that
it is raining”; “It has rained” (or “It rained in the past”) is analysed as
“It IS raining at a moment earlier than my assertion that it has rained”;
“It will rain” (or “It will rain in the future”) is read as “It IS raining
at a moment later than my assertion that it will rain”. (Cf. p. 331.)
In Scientific Thought (1923) Broad rejects the Eternalism he had defended
in his (1921a) article. He now advances a theory that “accepts the reality
of the present and the past, but holds that the future is simply nothing at
all” (1923, p. 66). An all-important corollary of this Growing Block Theory
is the thesis that temporal passage is a fundamental feature of reality.
This feature is accounted for in terms of what Broad holds is the most
fundamental form of change, becoming. Becoming is the coming into existence
of events.
Nothing has happened to the present by becoming past except that fresh
slices of existence have been added to the total history of the world. The
past is thus as real as the present. On the other hand, the essence of a
present event is, not that it precedes future events, but that there is
quite literally nothing to which it has the relation of precedence. The sum
total of existence is always increasing, and it is this which gives the
time-series a sense [i.e. direction] as well as an order. A moment t is
later than a moment t* if the sum total of existence at t includes the sum
total of existence t* together with something more. (1923, p. 66–7; Broad’s
italics.)
An event is present by virtue of being the most recent increment of
reality; when the event is present there is, as Broad says, nothing to which
it stands in the relation of precedence. The event becomes past by virtue of
acquiring new relations, and it acquires these relations because the sum
total of existence has been increased by the addition of fresh slices of
reality. Temporal passage is the continual growth of the sum total of
existence.[10]
One of the rivalling views on time Broad discusses is a theory that might
be labeled The Moving Spotlight Theory. The Moving Spotlight Theory accepts
the eternalist view that the past, the present, and the future are equally
real; it regards “the history of the world as existing eternally in a
certain order of events.” But it differs from the Russellian theory in that
it accepts presentness as an irreducible feature of reality. So the fact
that the leaf is falling now is not to be analysed as the fact that the
event is simultaneous with an utterance or a specific type of mental state.
The theory claims that presentness is a characteristic moving along the
order of events: “Along [the order of events], and in a fixed direction, […]
the characteristic of presentness [is] moving, somewhat like the spot of
light from a policeman’s bull’s-eye traversing the fronts of the houses in a
street. What is illuminated is the present, what has been illuminated is the
past, and what has not yet been illuminated is the future” (1923, p.
59).
Broad is critical of this theory. To understand the nature of time, The
Moving Spotlight Theory makes use of a spatial analogy. Such analogies “may
be useful for some purposes, but it is clear that they explain nothing.”
Firstly, Broad asks us to consider the successive lighting of
presentness—now on one event and now on another, and so on. This is itself
an event (or a series of events), “and ought therefore to be a part of the
series of events, and not simply something that happens to the latter from
outside” (1923, p. 60). If we suppose (as we seem compelled to) that it is
not a part of the original series of events, we are launched on a vicious
regress of time-dimensions. For then the successive lightning of later
events would have to be conceived of as an event of the second
order—happening in a time-dimension different from the original one formed
by the series of first-order events. Secondly he presents a related line of
reasoning—sometimes termed The Rate of Passage Argument: If anything moves,
it must move with some determinate velocity. It will always be sensible to
ask ‘How fast does it move?’ But since the series along which presentness is
supposed to move is itself temporal, this question becomes: ‘how great a
lapse of time 1 does presentness traverse in a unit of time 2?’ Again, a
regress of time-dimensions is imminent. (Both of these arguments receive a
clearer formulation and more extensive treatment in Broad (1938).)[11]
Broad’s later account of time differs in some significant respects from
both of the earlier accounts. He now views what he calls absolute becoming
as “the rock-bottom peculiarity of time”. Absolute becoming manifests itself
“as the continual supersession of what was the latest phase by a new phase,
which will in turn be superseded by another new one. This seems to me to be
the rock-bottom peculiarity of time, distinguishing temporal sequence from
all other instances of one-dimensional order, such as that of points on a
line, numbers in order of magnitude, and so on” (1959, p. 766).
This theory has, in Broad’s opinion, various advantages. One advantage
mentioned is that it seems to avoid the difficulties with the rate of times
passage—difficulties which besets the Moving Spotlight Theory, but arguably
also the Growing Block Theory. The proposed theory also avoids presupposing
that “what has not yet supervened and what has already been superseded in
some sense ‘co-exist’ with each other and with what is now occurring,” which
he views as a defect of the Moving Spotlight Theory. More interestingly, it
avoids what Broad now regards as a defect of the Growing Block Theory, viz.
that of presupposing “that phases, which have already supervened and been
superseded, in some sense ‘co-exist’ with each other and with that which is
now happening” (1959, p. 767).
(For a book-length study on Broad's philosophy of time, see Oaklander
2020.)
4. Free Will
Broad discusses the topic of free will in his inaugural lecture
“Determinism, Indeterminism, and Libertarianism” (1934). In this rather
dense lecture he approaches the issue by associating free will with moral
responsibility. More specifically, he frames it in terms of the conditions
necessary and sufficient for the applicability of ‘ought’ and ‘ought not’ to
actions. Everyone admits, he says, that there is some sense of ‘could’ in
which ‘ought’ and ‘ought not’ entail ‘could’. The question revolves around
the sense of ‘could’ involved here: in precisely what sense of ‘could’ is it
that if you to ought to perform an action you could perform that
action?
Let us introduce a couple of Broad’s stipulative definitions. An action is
obligable if and only if it is an action of which ‘ought to be done’ or
‘ought not to be done’ can be predicated. An action is substitutable if
either it was done but could have been left undone, or was left undone but
could have been done.
An action is obligable if and only if it is, in a certain sense,
substitutable. There are several different senses of ‘could’ and hence of
substitutability. Initially Broad focuses on a sense of ‘could’ which he
calls voluntary substitutability. Consider an action A that was not
performed. Suppose that if the agent had willed (chosen, decided) to do A
she would have done it. In that case A is voluntarily substitutable.
Suppose, however, that she would not have done A even if she had willed to
do it. If that’s the case, A is not voluntarily substitutable. Broad takes
it as evident that voluntary substitutability is a necessary condition for
obligability. That is, he takes it as evident that,
A is obligable only if A is voluntarily substitutable.
But is it also a sufficient condition? Is it also true that,
If A is voluntarily substitutable then A is obligable.
Broad presents an argument in favour of a negative answer, i.e. in favour
of the answer that it could very well be true that someone would have done
an action if he had willed to do it, while it is nonetheless false that the
action is obligable (and hence false that it is voluntarily substitutable).
We are asked to consider a person who gradually becomes addicted to a drug
like morphine. At the earlier stages he could have willed with sufficient
strength to ensure that the temptation would have been resisted. At the
later stages he could not. “Now at every stage, from the earliest to the
latest, the hypothetical proposition would be true: ‘If he had willed with a
certain degree of force and persistence to avoid taking morphine, he would
have avoided taking it’. Yet we would say at the earlier stages that he
ought to have resisted, whilst at the final stages we should be inclined to
say that ‘ought’ and ‘ought not’ have ceased to apply” (1934, p. 200). In
other words, in the later stages we are inclined to hold that the action of
abstaining from morphine has ceased to be obligable, in spite of the fact
that it remains true that if he had willed with sufficient force and
persistence to abstain he would have abstained.
This is Broad’s version of an argument sometimes raised against the
classical compatibilist conditional analysis of ‘S could have done
otherwise’.[12] According to the classical compatibilist analysis this is to
be understood simply as ‘if S had willed to act differently S would have
acted differently’. The argument shows that this will not do: there are
situations where an agent would have acted otherwise if she had willed
differently but nonetheless could not have acted differently simply because
she could not have willed to act differently.[13]
So voluntary substitutability is not sufficient for obligability: for an
action to be obligable it is not sufficient that the agent would have acted
otherwise if she had willed otherwise. It is also clear that a further
condition must be fulfilled, viz. that she could have willed to act
otherwise. This leads us to the question as to the correct analysis of
‘could have willed differently’. Broad examines a conditional analysis
according to which this means:
If S had willed differently in the past S’s conative-emotional dispositions
and knowledge about S’s own nature would have been so constituted that S, at
the time when S acted, would have willed differently.
Can we perhaps claim an action to be obligable if (a) it is voluntarily
substitutable, and (b) the agent could have willed to do it, in the
specified conditional sense of ‘could have willed’? In other words, is the
joint condition of (a) and (b) sufficient for obligability? Broad rejects
this proposal. Suppose the agent could not have willed differently in the
past (say six months ago). It is “surely irrelevant to say that, if he had
done so his conative dispositions would have been different at a later stage
from what they in fact were then, and that he would have willed otherwise
than he then did” (1934, p. 204). As he points out, at this juncture it is
tempting to refer to still earlier volitions (say twelve months ago). He
contends, however, that this is useless since the very same difficulty will
reappear.
Broad holds, then, that neither ‘could have acted differently’ nor ‘could
have willed differently’ can be given a conditional analysis. Having
discarded conditional types of substitutability he turns to categorical
substitutability. If an action is obligable it must be substitutable in a
categorical sense. “We must be able to say of an action, which was done,
that it could have been avoided, in some sense of ‘could’ which is not
definable in terms of ‘would have, if’” (1934, p. 204). Note that the quoted
passage merely states that categorical substitutability is a necessary
condition of obligability. It is clear, however, that Broad also takes it to
be a sufficient condition. Thus, his position is that,
A is obligable if and only if A is categorically substitutable.
Now precisely what is categorical substitutability? As we shall presently
see, Broad claims that this notion is only partly intelligible.
Categorical substitutability involves a negative and a positive condition.
These are necessary and jointly sufficient for obligability. The negative
condition says that the agent’s willing of a certain action was not
completely determined by the nomic and singular conditions which existed at
the time of willing. Not surprisingly, Broad regards an action that merely
fulfils this condition as “an accident, lucky or unlucky as the case may
be.” Neither the agent nor “anything else in the universe can properly be
praised or blamed for it” (1934, p. 212; Broad’s italics).
The positive condition (which must also be fulfilled) says that the willing
of the action is “literally determined by the agent or self, considered as a
substance or continuant, and not by a total cause which contains as factors
events in and dispositions of the agent” (1934, p. 214–5; Broad’s italics).
Thus a free action is an action that is caused by the agent.
(Note that the view that there are agent-caused effects is a form of
indeterminism, since it says that there are certain events which, although
they are indeed caused, are not fixed as a matter of natural law.)
Broad rejects the idea of agent-causation as unintelligible.
Now it is surely quite evident that, if the beginning of a certain process
at a certain time is determined at all, its total cause must contain as an
essential factor another event or process which enters into the moment from
which the determined event or process issues. I see no prima facie objection
to there being events which are not completely determined. But, in so far as
an event is determined, an essential factor in its total cause must be other
events. How could an event possibly be determined to happen at a certain
date if its total cause contained no factor to which the notion of date has
any application? And how can the notion of date have any application to
anything that is not an event? (1934, p. 215; Broad’s emphasis.)
If an agent wills to perform an action at a certain time there must be a
process or event that occurs at that time (or the moment before). Thus there
must be something about the agent that explains why the willing of the
action started precisely at that time rather than at a slightly earlier or
later time. The agent per se will not do.
The position Broad reaches is a version of what is sometimes called free
will pessimism: free will is incompatible with determinism, but there is no
viable form of indeterminism which leaves room for free will, either;
therefore, free will does not exist—indeed could not exist.
5. Emergentism
In the last chapter of his monumental The Mind and Its Place in Nature
Broad defends an Emergentist position with respect to the relation between
mind and matter: mental properties are, in his opinion, distinct from
physical properties; they are properties that emerge when neurophysiological
processes have attained a sufficiently high degree of complexity. His
discussion and defense of Emergentism features two chief elements. Firstly,
there is a meticulous examination of the concept of emergence as such;
secondly, there is a discussion of whether there is reason to think that
emergent phenomena actually exist.
5.1 The Concept of Emergence
Chapter Two of The Mind and its Place in Nature is devoted to a thorough
discussion of the notion of emergence. In this chapter Broad is primarily
interested in the notion or concept of emergence per se. Thus he is there
not so much interested in the actual existence of emergent phenomena.
An emergent property of an aggregate or a whole is, very roughly, a
property that is something over and above the properties of its parts and
the way they are arranged in the aggregate. Broad prefers to capture this in
epistemic terms: an emergent property of a whole is a property that it is
impossible to logically infer from even the most complete knowledge of the
properties of the parts of the whole. A property that can be so inferred is
a reducible property. He captures the contrast between emergent and
reducible properties in the following passage.
Put in abstract terms the emergent theory asserts that there are certain
wholes composed (say) of constituents A, B, and C in a relation R to each
other; that all wholes composed of constituents of the same kind as A, B,
and C in relations of the same kind as R have certain characteristic
properties; that A, B, and C are capable of occurring in other kinds of
complex where the relation is not of the same kind as R; and that the
characteristic properties of the whole R(A, B, C) cannot, even in theory, be
deduced from the most complete knowledge of the properties of A, B, and C in
isolation or in other wholes which are not of the form R(A, B, C). The
mechanistic theory rejects the last clause of this assertion. (1925, p.
61)
‘The mechanistic theory’ is Broad’s label for the theory that today is
termed ‘physicalism.’
Suppose a certain biological feature, e.g. the capacity for nutrition, is
an emergent property. This means that the property is not a mere result of
an immensely high degree of organisational complexity at the chemical level.
The property is, to be sure, nomically dependent on the chemical level, but
it is not a mere resultant of the properties, relations, and laws operative
at that level. If nutrition were a mere resultant property it would be a
reducible property; it would be a property that theoretically can be
inferred from features at the chemical level (i.e. the properties, relations
and laws which characterise the constituents in isolation or in other wholes
than the one in question).
Broad’s concept of emergence is weakly epistemic; his notion is at heart
metaphysical: the epistemic predicament that we are in vis-à-vis an emergent
property reflects an important metaphysical fact about the property in
question, viz. that it is neither identical with nor constituted by the
properties and relations of the constituents of the whole in question. Thus
Broad’s notion of emergence contrasts with a strongly epistemic notion
which, very roughly, says that a property is emergent for a finite epistemic
subject when provided with fairly extensive information about the properties
and relations of the constituents the subject is still unable logically to
infer that property from the information in question although the property
in fact is reducible to the features of the constituents.
Hempel and Oppenheim (1948) raise several objections to Emergentism. Brief
attention to two of their objections will help bring out at least a couple
of the many facets of Broad’s subtle account. Firstly, to assume that
emergent phenomena exist is to assume that there are certain phenomena that
have “a mysterious quality of absolute unexplainability”. They confidently
assert that “emergence […] is not an ontological trait inherent in some
phenomena; rather it is indicative of the scope of our knowledge at a given
time” (p. 119). This objection in effect implies that the metaphysical
notion of emergence is dismissed in favour of a strongly epistemic
notion.
Broad stresses that it is an empirical question whether a certain
biological or chemical phenomenon is emergent or not. It is always possible
that what strikes us as an emergent property of a biological of chemical
phenomenon “is due to our imperfect knowledge of microscopic structure or to
our mathematical incompetence” (1925, p. 81). He also emphasises the
practical importance of seeking to devise reductions for as many properties
as possible: that ambition is “the natural and proper ambition of the
scientists” (1933, p. 268).
It should perhaps also be added that although emergent properties are
indeed “unexplainable” in the sense that that they are not susceptible to a
reductive explanation, this does not mean that they are “unexplainable” in
every sense: the inherence of an emergent property in a particular whole
does admit of an explanation by nomic subsumption. We can explain its
inherence in terms of the nature of the whole and an emergent law. The law
of course remain a brute fact. But surely, so do some laws on any account of
the world.
Hempel and Oppenheim also object that Emergentists are erroneously
committed to regard the mass or weight of a whole as an emergent property.
(Weight is, of course, a reducible characteristic if there ever was one!)
The reason they give for this is that not even the weight of a whole can be
logically inferred from premises that solely contain propositions about the
weight of the parts; in addition a law is needed which expresses the weight
of the whole as some specific mathematical function of the weight of the
constituent (1948, p. 119). However, Broad’s account clearly anticipates the
objection. He provides the reason why a property such as weight (or mass)
should not be conceived as an emergent property. To “explain the behaviour
of any whole in terms of its structure and components we always need two
independent kinds of information. (a) We need to know how the parts would
behave separately. And (b) we need to know the law or laws according to
which the behaviour of the separate parts is compounded when they are acting
together in any proportion and arrangement” (1925, p. 61; Broad’s italics).
So to know about the mass of a whole X we need to know the mass of X’s parts
and the principle according to which the mass of a whole is determined by
the mass of the parts. It is through experience that we have found that the
mass of a whole is the mathematical sum of the mass of the parts; and it is
through experience we have found that the very same principle (or law of
composition) is applicable to any type of whole. To see this, consider the
last clause of Broad’s characterisation of emergent properties above. The
clause says that an emergent property of a certain whole cannot, even in
theory, be logically inferred from the most complete knowledge of the
properties of the parts in isolation or in other wholes which are not of the
form to be found the whole in question. Is this applicable to the mass of a
certain whole? Is it applicable to the mass of X? No, certainly not: we are
able to logically infer the mass of any whole, including X, from knowledge
of the masses of parts in isolation or in wholes other than X.
5.2 The Reality of Emergence
It is one thing to delineate the contours of the notion of emergence,
another to argue that emergent phenomena actually exist. A wide variety of
phenomena have been held to be emergent. Apart from consciousness, various
chemical and biological phenomena have been held to be emergent. Broad is
not willing to rule out a physicalistic reduction of chemistry and biology
to physics: chemical and biological phenomena might, he believes, very well
be reducible to complex microphysical processes. In his opinion, however,
consciousness is a different matter. We will turn to consciousness in a
moment. When it comes to biology and chemistry he declares that he does not
see any “a priori impossibility in a mechanistic biology or chemistry”
(1925, p. 72). He stresses that it is in practice enormously difficult to
know whether, say, a certain biological feature such as nutrition is
emergent or not. It is evident from what Broad says that he recognises that
the Emergentist stance has its dangers in that it tends to encourage
acceptance of laws and properties as ultimate and irreducible. There is a
danger in this because, as he notes, reductive explanations have proved
remarkably successful in the past, and there is the possibility that what we
take to be an emergent phenomenon is in fact reducible.
5.3 Broad’s Knowledge Argument
In the last chapter of his book Broad presents a taxonomy of no less than
seventeen different theories which are “possible theoretically on the
relation between Mind and Matter” (1925, p. 607). By a process of
elimination Broad arrives at a more wieldy number of theories. Two of the
remaining rivalling theories are Physicalism—in Broad’s terminology,
“Mechanism”—and Emergentism. Let us now take a closer look at his case for
Emergentism.
Broad adduces a version of what has come to be known as The Knowledge
Argument in favour of an Emergentist position with respect to the place of
consciousness in nature. He asks us to assume that there is a mathematical
archangel. The archangel’s mathematical and logical capability is unlimited;
in addition he is gifted with the capacity to perceive “the microscopic
structure of atoms as easily as we can perceive hay-stacks”. Now would there
be any limit to the archangel’s knowledge of the world? Broad’s answer is
Yes.
Take any ordinary statement, such as we find in chemistry books; e.g,
“Nitrogen and Hydrogen combine when an electric discharge is passed through
the mixture of the two. The resulting compound contains three atoms of
Hydrogen to one of Nitrogen; it is a gas readily soluble in water and
possessed of a characteristic smell.” If the mechanistic theory be true the
archangel could deduce from his knowledge of the microscopic structure of
atoms all these fact but the last. He would know exactly what the
microscopic structure must be; but he would be totally unable to predict
that a substance with this structure must smell as ammonia does when it gets
into the human nose. The utmost that he could predict on this subject would
be that certain changes would take place in the mucous membrane, the
olfactory nerves and so on. But he could not possibly know that these
changes would be accompanied by the appearance of a smell in general or of
the peculiar smell of ammonia in particular, unless someone told him so or
he had smelled it for himself. If the existence of the so-called “secondary
qualities,” or the fact of their appearance, depends on the microscopic
movements and arrangements of material particles which do not have these
qualities themselves, then the law of this dependence are certainly of the
emergent type. [1925, p. 71–2]
The archangel knows all the physicalistic (mechanistic) truths. There are,
however, some truths that he does not know. But if Physicalism were true the
archangel should know all truths. Physicalism is, therefore, false.
If sound, Broad’s argument establishes the negative conclusion that mental
phenomena are distinct from neurophysiological processes. By itself it does
not establish the Emergentist position, since the conclusion is consistent
with the truth of, say, Substance Dualism (or what Broad calls “Dualism of
incompatibles”). Broad’s overall argumentation for Emergentism, however,
also includes a fairly thorough discussion that seeks to undermine various
lines of argument to the effect that mental properties and physical
properties are incompatible, i.e. arguments to the effect that a material
whole such as a nervous system could not possibly have mental properties.
These are arguments that, if successful, would rule out Emergentism (which
is a form of property dualism) in favour of substance dualism. Broad’s case
for Emergentism, then, includes more than his knowledge argument and the
simple methodological point that Emergentism is a more ontologically
economical position than substance dualism.
6. Metaphilosophy
Broad distinguishes two chief aspects of philosophical thinking. He labels
these critical philosophy and speculative philosophy. Critical philosophy
has two chief tasks, one of which is to analyse “certain very general
concepts such as number, thing, quality, change, cause, etc.” (1924, p. 82).
We make use of these and a whole host of other concepts in science and
ordinary life. Although we are typically able to apply them fairly
consistently, we are not able to analyse them. Nor are we able to state
their precise relations to each other. One task of critical philosophy is to
provide analyses of such concepts. It becomes evident that this is an
important task as soon as it is realized that when we seek to apply these
concepts to odd or exceptional cases we are often uncertain whether they are
applicable. For example, it might be unclear whether a certain individual
with a multiple personality disorder is a person or not.[14] Such
difficulties arise because “we are not clear as to what we mean by ‘being a
person’” (1924, p. 83). There is, therefore, a need for an intellectual
discipline that seeks to analyse and define this and many other
concepts.
In science and in daily life we do not merely use unanalysed concepts. “We
also assume uncritically a number of very fundamental propositions. In all
our arguments we assume the truth of certain principles of reasoning. Again,
we always assume that every change has a cause. And in induction we
certainly assume something—it is hard to say what—about the fundamental
‘make-up’ of the existent world” (1924, p. 84).
The second task of critical philosophy is to examine these and other
fundamental assumptions; it is “to take these propositions which we
uncritically assume in science and daily life and to subject them to
criticism” (ibid.).[15]
In order to analyse a proposition we must seek to attain a clearer grasp of
the concepts featured in the proposition. Thus the analysis and criticism of
a proposition depends on the analysis of concepts. And vice versa: by
reflecting on the propositions in which a certain concept occurs we clear up
the meaning of it.
Now, critical philosophy is one part or aspect of philosophical thinking.
But critical philosophy “does not include all that is understood by
philosophy. It is certainly held to be the function of a philosopher to
discuss the nature of Reality as a whole, and to consider the position and
prospects of men in it” (1924, p. 96). This aspect of philosophical thinking
is speculative philosophy.
Speculative philosophy seeks to work out a view of reality as a whole by
taking into account the whole range of human experience—scientific, social,
ethical, æsthetic, and religious: “Its business is to take over all aspects
of human experience, to reflect upon them, and to try to think out a view of
Reality as a whole which shall do justice to all of them” (1924, p.
96).
Broad’s idea is that the various aspects of human experience and (putative)
facts linked to these provide a point of departure for philosophical
reflection—an exceedingly important sort of reflection aiming at a reasoned
view of Reality as a whole.
As can be gathered from the above, philosophical thinking features,
according to Broad, a distinctive type of birds-eye view. He calls it
synopsis. Let us take a somewhat closer look at this. The plain man as well
as the professional scientist or scholar conduct various parts of their living and their thinking in relatively
watertight compartments; turn blind eyes to awkward, abnormal, or marginal
facts; and skate successfully on the surface of the phenomena. But the
desire to see how the various aspects of experience hang together does arise
from time to time in most intelligent men, and philosophers are persons in
whom it is especially strong and persistent. Now I understand by synopsis
the necessary preliminary towards trying to satisfy this desire, viz. the
deliberate viewing together of aspects of human experience which are
generally viewed apart, and the endeavour to see how they are inter-related.
(1947a, p. 4)
On reflection it is clear that the synoptic stance is necessary for the
discovery of various inadequacies in our picture of reality, inadequacies
resulting from a far too insular perspective on reality. The synoptic stance
will, in effect, lead to the discovery of latent philosophical problems: “It
is synopsis, revealing prima facie incoherence, which is the main motive to
philosophical activity” (1958, p. 121; cf. 1947a, p. 16). And it is clearly
only after we have discovered and successfully addressed these problems that
we may lay claim to a satisfactory picture of reality as a whole.
Broad gives several examples of how synopsis is featured in philosophical
thinking. One of these is taken from the free will problem (1947a, pp.
8–11). In a very condensed form the main facts germane to the problem are
these: (i) When we consider a situation in which we did a certain action, we
are quite convinced that we could have done otherwise: we could have
performed an alternative action. On reflection it seems clear that ‘could’
is used in some sense that is not analysable in terms of ‘would have, if’.
(ii) Our moral judgments seem to presuppose that a person who in fact willed
to do a certain action could have willed otherwise. (iii) Given the past,
the actual situation and the laws of nature it seems impossible that
anything other should have happened than what in fact did happen. If so, how
can our volitions be other than completely determined? (iv) It is difficult,
then, to reconcile the notions of moral responsibility with the view that
our volitions are completely determined.
The problem of free will is discovered when we look at (i) and (ii) in the
light of (iii) In other words, the very problem is discerned only because we
have envisaged these facts together, i.e. because we have taken a synoptic
view of the facts.
7. Other Philosophical Work
Probability and Induction. Broad dealt with problems regarding
induction—“the glory of science and the scandal of philosophy”[16] —in a
number of papers. A sample of his work on the subject is the two early
papers entitled “The Relation Induction and Probability” (1918, 1920).
Broad’s focus is on the nature and justification of inductive inferences. He
argues that unless the conclusions of such inferences are cast in terms of
probability they all involve a formal fallacy. However in order to arrive at
justified inductive conclusions we cannot simply place our confidence in any
of the known principles of probability theory (such as those we employ in
reasoning with regard to artificial situations with bags containing red and
white balls, and the like): we need some further premise. Unfortunately,
this premise is “extremely difficult to state […] so that it shall be at
once plausible and non-tautologous” (1918, p. 389). Broad attempts to
articulate the supreme principle needed. He argues at length that the
principle needed says not simply (and crudely): “there is uniformity in
nature.” It also says that the particular things or substances in the world
subject to uniformity belong to a variety of natural kinds. Indeed, on
closer reflection it is clear that “[t]he notions of permanent substances,
genuine natural kinds, and universal causation are parts of a highly complex
and closely interwoven whole and any of them breaks down hopelessly without
the rest” (1920, p. 44). Notable also is the logic of conditions that
Broad’s formulates in “The Principles of Demonstrative Induction” (1930b).
He may quite well be the first who gave systematic attention to this
topic.[17]
Causation. Causation is dealt with in several of Broad’s works
(beginning as early as his first book, Perception, Physics and Reality,
1914). The logic of conditions formulated in (1930b) would square well with
some version of the regularity theory of causation. However, in several
works rather penetrating criticism of that theory is offered (e.g., in Ch.
3, 1925). In (1933) he tries to formulate an alternative. Causality involves
something between regularity and logical entailment; there is some form of
necessity, but not the kind involved in logical entailment. The latter is an
absolute necessity. Consider the proposition ’Anything that has shape would
have extension’. This is not only true in the actual world: it is true in
all logically possible worlds; there could not have been a world in which
there were things that had shape but lacked extension. Now compare the
proposition ’Anything that had inertial mass would have gravitational mass’.
There could not be things in the actual world which had inertial mass but
lacked gravitational mass. But there could have been a world in which there
were things that had inertial mass but lacked gravitational mass. The kind
of necessity involved here is a contingent necessity. (Cf. 1933, pp. 242–3.)
Broad is, however, rather skeptical of the alternative he has sought to
formulate. He says with characteristic candor that the notion of a necessity
which is contingent might very well be “sheer nonsense”.
The Unconscious. Broad examines issues surrounding “the unconscious”
at some length in The Mind and Its Place in Nature. His objective is to
capture a (literal) sense in which an experiential mental state may be said
to be unconscious. Although he rejects the view that the notion of
unconscious experience is incoherent he argues that there is no compelling
reason to assume that such actually exist. The assumption that there is a
pure neural state with causal properties that are similar to those of a
certain mental state is sufficient to explain the facts.
Time Consciousness. Broad gave two different accounts of temporal
experience.[18] Consider an experience of a succession of notes: Do–Re–Mi.
The earlier account claims that what one is aware of is temporally extended;
it includes the present note as well as the immediate past ones: “what is
sensed at any moment stretches a little way back behind that moment” (1923,
p. 348). What you are aware of when Mi is present extends to, and so
includes the past notes Re and Do. On the later account we are strictly
speaking aware only of the present note, Mi. But this awareness is coupled
with a representation of the past notes under a distinctive mode of temporal
presentation. Broad introduces the notion of presentedness. When you are
aware of the present note Mi it is apprehended as possessing the maximum
degree of presentedness, while the note Re is represented as possessing a
less degree of presentedness, and Do a still lesser degree.
The Philosophy of Parapsychology. Parapsychology is the study of
apparently paranormal events. Broad seeks to capture the nature and
importance of the subject. A paranormal event is an event that seems prima
facie to conflict with what he terms a basic limiting principle, i.e. a
principle that “we unhesitatingly take for granted as the framework within
which all our practical activities and our scientific theories are confined”
(1953, p. 7). There are a number of such principles. One says that an event
cannot begin to have any effect before it has occurred; another that
knowledge of the future is impossible except in certain familiar manners,
such as by inference from present facts. The basic limiting principles seem
to “cover very satisfactorily an enormous range of well-established facts of
the most varied kinds”. We are therefore “naturally inclined to think that
they must be all-embracing” (p. 8). And for that reason these principles are
of immense importance to our overall view of the universe and our place in
it. But just in proportion to this importance is “the philosophic importance
of any well-established exception to them” (p. 9).
The Philosophy of Religion. Broad’s writings on this subject have
the virtues characteristic of everything he wrote—thoroughness, lucidity and
fairness. Broad rejects the traditional arguments for the existence of God.
His essay “Arguments for The Existence of God” (1939) features a searching
critique of the cosmological argument and the ontological argument
(regarding the argument from design, Broad states that he has nothing to add
to the critique of Hume and Kant). He argues inter alia that the conclusion
of the cosmological argument has a consequence that few would stomach, viz.
that there are no really contingent facts, although many facts “seem
contingent relative to our ignorance”. As to the ontological argument Broad
claims that the notion of the greatest possible being is “meaningless
verbiage” unless the properties that are essential to the notion of God
admit of an intrinsic maximum. He argues that that condition is not
satisfied. Therefore, the argument is “wrecked before ever it leaves port.”
In the latter part of his essay Broad turns to the argument from religious
experience (in what might quite well be the first systematic treatment of
the argument). The position he takes is, in a nutshell, this. If a person
has an experience that she takes to be an experience of an X, it is
reasonable to conclude that she did experience an X unless there is some
positive reason to think otherwise. To refuse to apply this principle to
religious experiences is not reasonable. The question then is whether there
is some positive reason to think that religious experiences are delusive.
But on reflection it turns out there is no such reason. We may therefore
conclude that religious experiences are probably veridical.
Ethics. In writings up to, and including Five Types of Ethical
Theory Broad assumes that ethical sentences express judgements. He favours
an intuitionist or non-naturalist analysis. In later works, however, he is
undecided: it could be that ethical sentences express judgements; but,
alternatively, they may express emotions or commands. Notwithstanding this,
Broad fruitfully (and indefatigably!) classifies alternative types of
ethical theories, uncovers their underlying assumptions, and draws out their
logical consequences. As to normative ethics, Broad does not think the
utilitarian view that there is one and only one criterion of right action
can be sustained. Neither did he accept hedonism. There are, he argues,
other bearers of intrinsic value and disvalue than pleasure and pain.
Broad made many specific contributions to the subject of moral philosophy
that could be mentioned. Here are three of these. (i) There is a fine
discussion of psychological egoism (a discussion where he, as he quite
correctly says, gives the psychological egoist “the longest possible run for
his money”).[19] After Butler there is hardly need of further nails in the
coffin of that theory. But because of its shrewd and perceptive treatment of
human motivation Broad’s essay is nonetheless of remaining interest. (ii) In
Five Types Broad tentatively suggests a version of what is currently known
as The Fitting Attitude Analysis of value. He writes with characteristic
cautiousness: “I am not sure that ‘X is good’ could not be defined as
meaning that X is such that it would be a fitting object of desire to any
mind which had an adequate idea of its non-ethical characteristics” (p.
283).[20] (iii) In an early paper (1916), Broad seems to anticipate ideas
gaining currency much later among moral and political philosophers. He
suggests that the goodness of a complex state of affairs is not merely a
function of the value of its parts. Its goodness is restrained by a
condition which says, roughly, that the best possible state of affairs is
one where the producers of some good are as nearly as possible identical
with the enjoyers of that good. The principle says that the contributors to
a cooperative scheme is bound by a duty of fairness. The principle Broad
alludes to could be seen as an early version of the Principle of Fairness
(later to be found in the work of H. L. A. Hart and John Rawls).[21]
The History of Philosophy. Broad wrote on a variety of scattered
figures in the history of philosophy, e.g. Bacon, Butler, Berkeley, Newton,
Leibniz and Kant. A notable work is Five Types of Ethical Theory that
(alongside careful discussions of such philosophers as Spinoza and Hume)
includes a pioneering study of Henry Sidgwick’s The Methods of Ethics
(1874), written at a time when Sidgwick’s work had passed into nearly
complete oblivion. Noteworthy here also are the two posthumously published
book length studies on Leibniz and Kant, respectively. Both of these contain
shrewd philosophical comment that are of general philosophical
interest.
Bibliography
Primary Literature: Broad’s Works
-
[1914] Perception, Physics, and
Reality, Russell and Russell, New York, 1973; this edition is a reissue of
the work, originally published by Cambridge University Press in
1914.
-
[1915] “Phenomenalism,”
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 15: 227–51.
-
[1916] “On the Function of False
Hypotheses in Ethics,” International Journal of Ethics, 26: 377–97;
reprinted in Broad 1971, 43–62 and [available online].
-
[1918] “The Relation between
Induction and Probability (I)” Mind, 27: 389–404. Reprinted in Broad
(1968); page references to the original publication.
-
[1919] “Is there ‘Knowledge by
Acquaintance’?” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary
Volume 2: 206-20.
-
[1920] “The Relation between
Induction and Probability (II)” Mind, 29: 11–45. Reprinted in Broad
(1968); page references to the original publication.
-
[1921a] “Time,” in Encyclopedia of
Ethics and Religion, J. Hastings, et al. (eds.), Vol. 12, Edinburgh and
New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons.
-
[1921b] “The External World,”
Mind, 30: 385–408.
-
[1923] Scientific Thought, London:
Kegan Paul.
-
[1924] “Critical and Speculative
Philosophy,” in Contemporary British Philosophy (First Series), ed. by
J.H. Muirhead, London: Allen and Unwin.
-
[1925] The Mind and Its Place in
Nature, London: Kegan Paul.
-
[1928] “Time and Change,”
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 8:
175–88.
-
[1930a] Five Types of Ethical
Theory, London: Kegan Paul.
-
[1930b] “The Principles of
Demonstrative Induction,” I and II, Mind, 39: 302–17, 426–39. Reprinted in
Broad (1968); page references to the original publication.
-
[1933] An Examination of
McTaggart’s Philosophy (Volume I), Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
-
[1934] “Determinism,
Indeterminism, and Libertarianism,” inaugural lecture delivered at
Cambridge in 1934. Reprinted in Broad (1952); page references to
this.
-
[1938] An Examination of
McTaggart’s Philosophy (Volume II, Part 1), Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1938.
-
[1939] “Arguments for The
Existence of God,” I and II, in Broad (1953); originally in Journal of
Theological Studies, 40: 16–30, 156–67.
-
[1942] “Berkeley’s Argument about
Material Substance,” Proceedings of the British Academy, 28: 119–138; page
references to the reprint by Haskell House Publishers, New York,
1976.
-
[1945] “Some Reflections on Moral
Sense Theories in Ethics,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 45:
131–66.
-
[1947a] “Some Methods of
Speculative Philosophy,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,
Supplementary Volume 21: 1–32.
-
[1947b] “Professor Marc-Wogaus
Theorie der Sinnesdata” (I and II), Mind, 56: 1–30, 97–131.
-
[1949] “The Relevance of Psychical
Research to Philosophy,” in Broad (1953); originally in Philosophy, 24:
291–309.
-
[1952a] “Some Elementary
Reflexions on Sense-Perception,” Philosophy, 27: 3–17.
-
[1952b] Ethics and The History of
Philosophy, London: Routledge.
-
[1953] Religion, Philosophy and
Psychical Research, London: Routledge.
-
[1954a] “Berkeley’s Denial of
Material Substance,” The Philosophical Review, 63: 155–81.
-
[1954b] “Emotion and Sentiment,”
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 13: 203–214.
-
[1958] “Philosophy,” Inquiry, 1:
99–129.
-
[1959a] “A Reply to My Critics,”
in Schilpp (1959).
-
[1959b] “Autobiography,” in
Schilpp (1959).
-
[1968] Induction, Probability, and
Causation. Selected Papers by C. D. Broad, Dordrecht: Reidel.
-
[1971] Broad’s Critical Essays in
Moral Philosophy, edited by D. R. Cheney; New York: Humanities
Press.
-
[1975] Leibniz, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
-
[1978] Kant, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
-
[1985] Ethics, C. Levy (ed.);
Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.
Secondary Literature
-
Alexander, Samuel, 1920. Space, Time, and Deity, 2 volumes, London:
Macmillan & Co., Limited
-
Barnes, W.H.F., 1945. “The Myth of Sense-Data,” Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society, 45: 89–117.
-
Beckermann, A., 1992. “Supervenience, Emergence, and Reduction,” in
Beckermann, A., H. Flohr, and J. Kim, eds. (1992).
-
Beckermann, A., H. Flohr, and J. Kim (eds.), 1992. Emergence or
Reduction?, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter.
-
Blake, R.M., 1925. “On Mr. Broad’s Theory of Time,” Mind, 34:
418–35.
-
Braithwaite, R.B., 1928. “Time and Change,” Proceedings of the
Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume 8: 162–74.
-
Campbell, C.A., 1938. “In Defence of Free Will,” inaugural lecture;
reprinted in Campbell (1967).
-
–––, 1967.In Defence of Free Will and Other Philosophical Essays, London:
Allen & Unwin.
-
Chisholm, R.M., 1964. “Human Freedom and the Self,” The Langley Lecture,
University of Kansas; reprinted in Chisholm’s On Metaphysics, 1989.
-
–––, 1957. Perceiving: A Philosophical Study, Ithaca, NY: Cornell
University Press.
-
Cowan, R., 2015. “C. D. Broad on Moral Sense Theories in Ethics,”
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Virtual Issue: Methods of
Ethics), 3: 168–183.
-
Dainton, B., 2000. Stream of Consciousness: Unity and Continuity in
Conscious Experience, London and New York: Routledge.
-
–––, 2001. Space and Time, Ithaca: McGill-Queen’s University Press.
-
Ducasse, C.J., 1959. “Broad on the Relevance of Psychical Research to
Philosophy,” in Schilpp (1959).
-
Feigl, H., 1958. The ‘Mental’ and the ‘Physical’, Minneapolis, Minnesota
University Press, 1967; originally in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy
of Science, 2: 370–497.
-
Frankena, W.K., 1959. “Broad’s Analysis of Ethical Terms,” in Schilpp
(1959).
-
Gustavsson, K., 2002. Emergent Consciousness. Themes in C. D. Broad’s
Philosophy of Mind, Göteborg: Acta Philosophica Gothoburgensis.
-
Hare, R.M., 1959. “Broad’s Approach to Moral Philosophy,” in Schilpp
(1959).
-
Hempel, C.G. & Oppenheim, P., 1948. “The Logic of Explanation,” in
Readings in Analytical Philosophy, H. Regnell (ed.), Lund:
Läromedelsförlagen, 1971; originally in Philosophy of Science, 15:
132-75.
-
Körner, S., 1959. “Broad on Philosophical Method,” in Schilpp
(1959).
-
Kyburg, H. E., 1960. “Demonstrative Induction,” Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research, 21: 80–92.
-
Mabott, J.D., 1955. “The Specious Present,” Mind, 64: 376–83.
-
Marc-Wogau, K., 1959. “On C. D. Broad’s Theory of Sensa,” in Schilpp
(1959).
-
–––, 1943. “Die Theorie der Veränderung bei C. D. Broad,” Theoria, 9:
91–123; translated as “C. D. Broad’s Theory of Change” in Marc-Wogau
(1967).
-
–––, 1967. Philosophical Essays, Gleerup: Lund.
-
Markosian, N., 1993. “How Fast Does Time Pass?” Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research, 53: 829–44.
-
Maund, B., 2003. Perception, Bucks: Acumen, 2003.
-
McLaughlin, B.P., 1992. “The Rise and Fall of British Emergentism,” in
Beckermann, A., H. Flohr, and J. Kim, eds. (1992).
-
McNaughton, D. and P. Rawling, “On C. D. Broad’s ‘On the Function of
False Hypothesis in Ethics’,” Ethics, 125: 512–516.
-
Merricks, T., 2006. “Good Bye Growing Block” Oxford Studies in
Metaphysics (Volume 2), D. Zimmerman (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
-
Mundle, W.C.K., 1954. “How Specious is the ‘Specious Present’?” Mind, 63:
26–48.
-
–––, 1959. “Broad’s Views about Time,” in Schilpp (1959).
-
Nielsen, K., 1994. “Broad’s Conception of Critical and Speculative
Philosophy,” Dialectica, 48: 47–54.
-
Oaklander, L.N., 2020. C. D. Broad’s Philosophy of Time, New York:
Routledge.
-
O’Connor, T., 1994. “Emergent Properties,” American Philosophical
Quarterly, 31: 91–104.
-
Price, H.H., 1932. Perception, London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., second
revised ed., 1950.
-
–––, 1959. “The Nature and Status of Sense-Data in Broad’s Epistemology,”
in Schilpp (1959).
-
Rashbrook, O. W., 2012. “Broad’s Account of Temporal Experience,” Journal
for the History of Analytic Philosophy, 1: 1–25.
-
Redpath, Th., 1997. “Cambridge Philosophers VIII: C. D. Broad,”
Philosophy, 72: 571–594.
-
Robinson, H.M., 1994. Perception, London: Routledge.
-
Rowe, W.L., 1982. “Religious Experience and The Principle of Credulity,”
International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 13: 85–92.
-
Savitt, S.F., 2002. “On Absolute Becoming and The Myth of Passage,” in
Time, Reality, and Experience, Craig Callender (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
-
Schilpp, P.A. (ed.), 1959. The Philosophy of C. D. Broad, New York: Tudor
Publishing Company.
-
Segelberg, I., 1953. Studier över medvetandet och jagidén, [Studies of
Consciousness and The Idea of The Self], Stockholm, Svenska
Tryckeriaktiebolaget; translated in Segelberg (1999).
-
–––, 1999. Three Essays in Phenomenology and Ontology, Stockholm, Thales,
1999; contains Segelberg’s three books, including Segelberg (1953),
translated by Herbert Hochberg and Susanne Ringström Hochberg.
-
Smith, A. D., 2002. The Problem of Perception, Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
-
Stace, W.T., 1959. “Broad’s Views on Religion,” in Schilpp (1959).
-
Stephan, A., 1992. “Emergence—A Systematic View on its Historical
Facets,” in Beckermann, A., H. Flohr, and J. Kim (eds.) (1992).
-
Thomas, E., 2019. “The Roots of C. D. Broad’s Growing Block Theory of
Time,” Mind, 128: 527–549.
-
von Wright, G.H., 1959. “Broad on Induction and Probability,” in Schilpp
(1959).
Other Internet Resources
-
Philosophical Alternatives from C. D. Broad, an extremely valuable
resource, with a full bibliography of C. D. Broad’s writings, as well as
many online texts.
-
C. D. Broad: a bibliography, a valuable resource by Pablo Stafforini,
featuring an even more extensive set of online texts and links to PDFs
of Broad’s writings.
Related Entries
consciousness: temporal | emergent properties | incompatibilism: arguments
for | induction: problem of | perception: the problem of | qualia: knowledge
argument | religion: philosophy of | sense data | space and time: being and
becoming in modern physics | time | value theory
Acknowledgments
I would like to thank Jan Almäng, Jens Johansson and the anonymous referees
for helpful comments.
